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or standard to guide the court. The court might evaluate the current
attitude of the general public toward permitting the work on Sunday,
but in any evenf there is no choice but to arbitrarily decide on this
specific work. The decision of such a case renders the statute no less
vague; it clarifies the statute in only one isolated situation. The
countless numbers of other persons feeling a need to work or operate
their business on Sunday remain without a guide.
As pointed out by the court in the principal case, when there are
"conflicting emotions" about a law, "such conflicts are better brought
to the floor of the legislature." 40 This is true but it relates to the purpose of the statute, not the form. The constitutionality of the purpose
of the Sunday closing statute is conceded. It must, however, meet the
test of all criminal statutes; "the elements constituting the offense
must be so clearly stated and defined as to reasonably admit of but
one construction."41 The Kentucky Sunday closing statute does not
meet this test. "Works of necessity" is not "clearly stated," makes no
attempt to "define" anything and may "reasonably admit" to more
than "one construction."
Until a statute is enacted in clear and definite terms, the people
of the state should not be governed by a law that is unconstitutionally
vague. To allow this confers "upon the courts powers both arbitrary,
legislative in character and ex post facto in effect." 42 Since there are
only nine specific exceptions in the present Kentucky Sunday closing
statute, the majority of situations would be covered by the "works
of necessity" clause. Voiding this clause would in effect void the
entire statute.
Mark E. Gormley

CGEvINAL LAv-INSANITY AND CGdfvIINAL RESPONSiBflrI'Y-TiE

OF THE M'NAuGHTEN PLuS Thm SmSTmrB

STATUs

IMPUMSE TEsT.-The defendant

was convicted of murder and sentenced to death on evidence that he
shot and killed his son. The defense was not guilty by reason of
insanity. Instructions were given incorporating the M'Naughten

(right-wrong) plus irresistible impulse test as a means of determining
the criminal responsibility of the accused. The court reviewed the
entire record of the case although no bill of exceptions was filed.
Held: Reversed. The court incorporated the Model Penal Code test
40

Store of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 369 S.W.2d 9,
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84 Aip. D.C. 592 (1910).
Arlan s Dept. Store of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 869 S.W.2d 9, 13 (Ky.

Arlan's Department
18 (Ky. 1963).
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as follows: "Before the defendant can be excused on the ground of
insanity, the jury must believe from the evidence that at the time of
committing the offense in question, the defendant as a result of mental
defect or disease did not have substantial capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law." Terry v. Commonwealth, 371
S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963).
The M'Naughten plus irresistible impulse test was, and remains,
the best test for legal insanity and its use should be continued. It is
followed by a large majority of jurisdictions in the United States1 and
was derived from an advisory opinion following a middle-nineteenth
century decision of an English court.2 The basic criteria of the test
are whether the defendant, at the time of the killing, was without
sufficient reason to know what he was doing, or had not sufficient
reason to know right from wrong.3 The test has been subjected to
vigorous criticism, particularly by medical experts, who contend that
it poses a moral query which is not within their province 4 and that the
test leaves the psychiatrist talking about mental illness and the attorney
speaking in terms of morality. 5 Justices Frankfurter," Douglas, 7 and
the late Justice Cardozo8 have criticized the test. It has been said
that M'Naughten has led its hardy existence because, "like the fictional
presumption that every man knows the law, it is socially useful."9
The two basic theories of the states which advocate the continued
use of M'Naughten are: (1) it furnishes the most useful and logical
criteria available, 10 and (2) even though it should not be the ultimate,
it presents the best criteria available for determining criminal responsibility.'" The irresistible impulse test 12 is a supplement to M'Naughten
IAnnot.,
45 A.L.R.2d 1452 (1956).
2
M'Naughten's Case, 10 Clark and Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
3 Ibid. See also Abbott v. Commonwealth, 107 Ky. 624, 55 S.W. 196 (1900).
4 Overholser, Criminal Responsibility: A Psychiats'es Viewpoint, 48 A.B.A.J.
527 (1962).
5
Committee on Psychiatry and Law of the Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry, Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric Expert Testimony, Rep. No. 26
(1954).
ORoyal Commission on Capital Punishment, p. 102, para. 290, H. M.
Stationary Office (1953).
7Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 485 (1956).
8 Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do for Law, Law and Literature and Other
Essays and Addresses by Benjamin N. Cardozo, Harcourt, Brace, N.Y. (1931).
9 Davidson, The Psychiatrist'sRole in the Administration of Criminal Justice,
4 Rutgers
L. Rev. 578 (1960).
0
- Mueller, M'Naughten Remains Irreplacable: Recent Events in the Law of
Incapacity, 50 Geo. L.J. 105 (1961-62).
13 Cavanaugh, Problems of a Psychiatristin OperatingUnder the M'Naughten,
Durham and Model Penal Code Rules, 45 Marq. L. Rev. 478 (1961-62). See
Minty, Insanity and Diminished Responsibility as Defences on Criminal Charges,
29 Medico-Legal
J. 141 (1961).
12
Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1453 (1956).
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which will acquit the accused if, at the time of the killing, as a result
of mental unsoundness he had not the sufficient will power to govern
his actions by reason of some insane impulse which he could not resist
or control.' 3 This addition to M'Naughten at most helps preserve
the principle of freedom of the will.14
The Model Penal Code test,15 as incorporated in the new Kentucky
rule, was applied in the federal case of United States v. Currens.16
The test has been severally criticized because it seemingly substitutes
irresistible impulse alone for the M'Naughten rule, thus allowing every
defendant with the opportunity to admit that his understanding was
normal, and also to contend that he was so unable to control himself
that he was driven to kill.' It is also acknowledged that it is merely a
rewording of M'Naughten plus irresistible impulse in more sophisticated language and therefore will yield the same result.'8 This test
is criticized by medical experts on the same grounds as M'Naughten
and was, in fact, rejected by the three psychiatric consultants on the
19 The majority in
committee formulating it.
the principal case admitted that the test was merely being put in a different form, not for
the benefit of the jury, but for the benefit of medical witnesses, to
enable them to lend more assistance to the court and jury in de20
termining the defendant's mental state.
A third test, rejected in Terry as unsound,2- uses the criterion of
whether the unlawful act was "the product of a mental disease or
defect," and is commonly known as the Durham test.22 It is the
favorite of medical experts because it enables them to communicate
to the jury using the terms of their trade, and to give a picture of the
whole man.23 Legal experts severely criticize Durham because it fails
to provide a sufficient standard which tests legal insanity. Under this
rule, if expert witnesses differ, the jury must credit the testimony of
one while disregarding that of the other.2 4
133

Stanley's Instructions § 901

14 Cavanaugh, supra note 11.

(2d ed. 1957).

15 ALl Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4, p. 159-60 (1962).

10290 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1961).

17 Hall, Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility-M'Naughtenversus Durham and the American Law Institute's Tentative Draft, 83 Ind. L.J. 212, 222
(1957-58).
I8 Gleuch, Law and Psychiatry-Cold War or Extente Cordiale? (1962).
19 Overholser, Criminal Responsibility: A Psychiatrist'sViewpoint, 48 A.B.A.J.
527, 530 (1962).

-o Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963).
21 Ibid.
22"Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
23 Overholser, supra note 19, at 529.
24 Sobeloff, Insanity and the CriminalLaw: From M'Naughten to Durham and
Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793, 795 (1955).
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In the principal case, the dissenting opinion, favoring the retention
of the M'Naughten plus irresistible impulse test, said: "Rules of law of
long standing should not be cast aside lightly but only upon a sound
and meritorious basis. Such rules are not flapjacks and should not be
tossed about as such."25 This decision came less than thirty days after
the court upheld the test which it had followed for sixty-two years.26
Joseph Weintraub, Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court,
said in a recent article that as a practicing attorney, he fought for the
removal of the M'Naughten test and then as a judge, he realized that
the struggle between M'Naughten and its competitors is over an
28
irrelevancy 27 and refused to overturn the older rule.
This is not to say that M'Naughten and irresistible impulse are
the perfect solution. Given the fact that a defendant commits a
crime, he is at least slightly abnormal. 28 The primary purpose in this
field then, is to insure against repetition of criminal acts for the
protection of society. Obviously, some rule should be formulated
which will aid both legal and medical experts in their determination of
criminal responsibility. But until some better means to reach the
desired end are found, a rule which has proved durable and practical
for many years should not be rejected.
John Dixon, Jr.

CONSTrrTUiONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS OF TE FouTrTEAmNDMmT
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The petitioner, Gideon, convicted of a non-capital felony offense in a
Florida state court after entering a plea of not guilty, filed a habeas
corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court. His petition alleged
that the trial court's denial of his request for court appointed counsel

abridged his constitutional rights as he was without funds with which
to retain counsel. The Florida Supreme Court, without opinion,
denied him relief.1 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari with leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 2 Held: Reversed. A
25

Terry v. Commonwealth, supra note 20, at 866.

26
Newsome
27

v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1962).
Weintraub, Criminal Responsibilitu: Psychiatry Atone Cannot Determine It,
49 A.B.A.J.
1075 (1963).
28
State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 82, 152 A.2d 50, 74 (1959).
29
The article is based on this premise-Goldstein and Katz, Some Observations
on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 Yale L.J.
225 (1960-61).
1 Gideon v. Cochran, 135 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1961).
2 Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908 (1962). The Court appointed counsel to
represent Gideon on appeal and requested that the briefs discuss the question:

"Should this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 ... be reconsidered?"

